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ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical studies on the professionalization of parties often suffer from a lack of data. However, this 
analysis of Belgian parties’ human capital is based on reliable data derived from annual financial 
statements and covers a sixteen-year period (1999 to 2014). Five hypotheses addressing increasing 
professionalization and inter-party differences concerning staff size were tested empirically. While the 
temporal evolution was investigated through a descriptive analysis, a multivariate regression model 
was set up to explain differences between political parties’ human capital. The descriptive analysis 
shows that Belgian parties have not grown increasingly capital-intensive between 1999 and 2014. The 
explanatory analysis demonstrates that older, more leftist and electorally stronger parties have a more 
capital-intensive extra-parliamentary organization.   
 
Keywords: Party organization, Professionalization, Political finance, Party state, Partitocracy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Scholars of party organizations label present-day political parties as capital-intensive electoral 
machines (Krouwel, 2012; Mair, Müller, & Plasser, 2004; Scarrow & Webb, 2013). This evolution 
towards electoral-professionalism has increased the importance of staff for the inner workings of party 
organizations (Mancini, 1999; Panebianco, 1988). Political office-holders are assisted by a variety of 
political aids, ranging from strategists to fundraisers and policy advisors. As a result, these unelected 
agents are often assumed to have a considerable impact on political decision-making.  This process of 
professionalization has been reinforced by the dropping membership rates of political parties 
(Wauters, 2017). While party members could initially serve as volunteers supporting the party 
organization, these diminishing free labor forces were replaced by paid employees. Yet despite the 
relevance of the subject, research on the staff of political parties remains scarce (Webb & Kolodny, 
2006).  
 
Scholars of party politics have investigated professionalization empirically from two different angles. 
Large-N comparative analyses of staff numbers have addressed the quantitative aspects of 
professionalization, studying both longitudinal trends (Katz & Mair, 1993; Krouwel, 2012) and 
international differences (Poguntke, Scarrow, & Webb, 2016). Others have investigated the qualitative 
side of professionalization by measuring individual characteristics of staff members through survey 
methods (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003).  Regardless of the chosen approach, parties 
have reportedly been reluctant towards sharing information about their human capital (Poguntke et 
al., 2016; Webb & Kolodny, 2006). In the Belgian case, however, the annual financial statements of the 
parties offer a unique opportunity. From these statements, data on staff levels and staff expenses for 
the ten biggest parties represented in the national assembly (Table 1) were selected for a sixteen-year 
period (1999 – 2014).  
 
Party Party system Party family Seats Vote share 
N-VA Flemish Conservative 33 20% 
PS Francophone Socialist 23 12% 
MR Francophone Liberal 20 10% 
CD&V Flemish Christian democrat 18 12% 
Open Vld Flemish Liberal 14 10% 
Sp.a Flemish Socialist 13 9% 
cdH Francophone Christian democrat 9 5% 
Ecolo Francophone Ecologist 6 3% 
Groen Flemish Ecologist 6 5% 
Vlaams Belang Flemish Right wing 3 4% 
Table 1: Belgian parties included in the analysis (current electoral & parliamentary weight)    
 
As the format of these public documents is consistent and uniform, these sources provide 160 data 
points that are suited for a reliable comparative analysis. This enabled us to examine longitudinal 
trends and explore a new area of investigation: explaining the differences between parties within 
countries. As a result, this paper addresses two research questions:  
 
- RQ 1: Which trends characterize the evolution of political professionalism within Belgian parties 
between 1999 and 2014? 
- RQ 2: Which factors can explain the differences in professionalism between these parties?  
 
The first research question will be handled through a descriptive analysis of the trends that took place 
during the studied period. This will be complemented by an explanatory analysis, as we investigate 
which factors have an impact on the differences between parties. The analysis relies on two key 
indicators (staff figures, staff expenses) and considers their relation with the organizational strength 
of parties (members, total expenditure).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, the existing literature on political professionalism will be 
introduced, followed by a discussion of the potential determinants of the staff size of parties. Second, 
the specificities of political professionalism within the Belgian context will be addressed. After focusing 
on our data and method, we turn towards the empirical analysis. After investigating which general 
trends have taken place between 1999 and 2014, our theoretical discussion is translated into an 
explanatory model based on electoral performance, party age, government status, ideology and party 
system.  
 
2. Political professionalism: operationalization and determinants 
 
In recent decades, literature on political professionalization has gradually emerged and expanded. 
However, the exact meaning of the concept has been the subject of considerable discussion (Lilleker 
& Negrine, 2002). Professionalization has been approached from a series of different angles: from the 
career patterns of elected officials (Borchert, 2003; Weber, 1921) to the diffusion of campaigning 
practices (Gibson & Rommele, 2001; Stromback, 2009; Tenscher & Mykkanen, 2014). Others have 
addressed the relation between external consultants and parties (Dulio, 2006; Farrell, Kolodny, & 
Medvic, 2001). Yet our analysis is exclusively directed at internal employees: the non-elected staff 
members working inside the party organization (Karlsen, 2010). First, we address how these internal 
party employees relate to the larger concept of political professionalization. Second, we discuss the 
different determinants that might explain differences between parties’ staff size and formulate 
corresponding hypotheses. 
 
2.1. Party staff and the concept of professionalization 
 
Concerning internal party employees, the process of professionalization contains two separate 
evolutions. First, it entails a quantitative shift towards increasing numbers staff members. This 
evolution has been interpreted as a transition from labour-intensive to capital-intensive forms of party 
organization (Farrell & Webb, 2000). Whereas volunteers and party activists played a vital role within 
labour-intensive organizations, today’s capital-intensive party organizations increasingly rely on paid 
employees instead. This quantitative dimension of professionalization has typically been 
operationalized through staff numbers. This indicator has been used to illustrate shifting balances 
between the different faces of parties (Katz & Mair, 1993), map the increase of staff members through 
time (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Krouwel, 2012) and compare staff levels between different Western 
democracies (Poguntke et al., 2016).  
 
Second, the professionalization of party employees implies a qualitative shift towards a different kind 
of staff with more developed skills and education. This evolution has been interpreted as transition 
from bureaucrats towards better educated professionals with higher levels of expertise (Panebianco, 
1988). In contrast to bureaucrats, Panebianco envisioned professionals to have a higher economic 
status, have a better education, to serve as an expert within the organization and to be more 
independent from political leadership. From this point of view, the process of increasing 
professionalism (cf. professionalization) is about a specific type of political employee becoming more 
central to the functioning of parties (Webb and Kolodny, 2006). Today, this distinction can best be 
interpreted as a division between administrative, bureaucratic positions and strategical, professional 
job descriptions involving political expertise (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). This qualitative dimension of 
professionalization addresses the individual characteristics of employees and has been analyzed 
through survey data from one (Webb & Fisher, 2003) or several parties (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017).  
 
This paper focuses exclusively on the quantitative aspects of party employees. The available staff data 
do not contain information on the individual characteristics of employees: such data are hard to obtain, 
even elementary data on staff size are often lacking. We acknowledge that staff size is only a robust 
indicator of political professionalism as whole. Therefore, instead of equating staff size to 
professionalism in general, the analysis will rely on more specific terminology from here on by referring 
to capital intensity and the human capital of parties when applying staff data as an empirical indicator. 
 
2.1. Understanding and explaining capital intensity 
 
How can this quantitative dimension of professionalization be explained understood? In this section, 
we address the existing theoretical assumptions about the evolution of parties’ human capital 
(temporal variation) and the differences between parties (spatial variation). The discussion will borrow 
from existing literature (both theoretical and empirical) in setting up the causal mechanisms that 
underpin the 5 hypotheses guiding the empirical analysis. As no unified scheme of interpretation exists 
for professionalization (even less so for the quantitative dimension), causal argumentations have been 
constructed through combination of literature on professionalization and party politics at large. 
 
The assumption of increasing capital-intensity the most recurring theme in existing literature. This 
organizational evolution is a common thread in influential publications on party transformation 
(Krouwel, 2006): caused by catchallization (Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988) and accelerated by 
cartelization (Katz & Mair, 1995) and the rise of business-firm parties (Hopkin & Paolucci, 1999). Hence, 
growing capital-intensity embodies the central claim of professionalization and has received most 
empirical attention within this field of research. Longitudinal comparative analyses have established 
an almost universal growth of both central and public office staff in European democracies since the 
1950’s (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Katz & Mair, 1993; Krouwel, 2012). However, such long term data on 
the Belgian case are absent. Belgian parties likely underwent a similar process, especially after the 
move towards cartelization after 1989. As the earliest data points in the dataset only date back to 
1999,  this notable shift will probably not be observable in the analysis. Nonetheless, we anticipate 
that the persistence of generous public funding has stimulated parties to further develop capital-
intensive organizations within this shorter time span. 
 
 H1: Belgian political parties have grown more capital-intensive between 1999 and 2014. 
   
Based on an international-comparative study, Poguntke et al. (2016) established that systemic effects 
are best at explaining variation in staff figures. Their empirical analysis has indicated that differences 
between European nations are more distinctive than those between party families. Several elements 
might explain this. First, these systemic differences could be attributed to political finance regimes, as 
some nations might subsidize their political parties more generously than others. Second, international 
patterns might be connected to institutional characteristics (e.g. the electoral, political or media 
system), since they determine the structure of interparty competition. Such a hypothesis shows 
parallels to how Farrell (1996) theorized about differences in campaign professionalization: he expects 
the phenomenon to be the greatest in presidential and majoritarian systems with high popular access 
to a commercialized media market. Third, the observed national uniformity could also be linked to 
contagion effects within party systems, with parties copying each other’s behavior or organizational 
structure. Similarly, existing models of party change (in casu: professionalization) argue that parties 
will adapt to innovations of others when they are perceived as a competitive advantage (Appleton & 
Ward, 1997; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988; Wilson, 1980).  
 
As Belgium counts two separate party systems (Flemish and Francophone), party systemic effects 
might have created two distinct environments for party organizations (De Winter, Swyngedouw, & 
Dumont, 2006). As the institutional environment (electoral system, political finance regime) is similar, 
the analysis can single out the impact of party systems. Hence, Belgium parties provide a specific 
opportunity for testing the potential impact of party-systemic effects. Based on the country effects 
demonstrated in earlier research (Poguntke et al., 2016), we anticipate a different level of capital 
intensity for each party system.  
 
H2: Flemish and Francophone parties have different levels of capital intensity. 
 Socialist and Christian democratic parties have the highest recorded levels of human capital in existing 
empirical studies (Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016). This contemporary observation aligns 
perfectly with the seminal work on professionalization by Panebianco (1988), who conceived the 
electoral-professional party model as the successor of mass parties from socialist and Christian 
democratic traditions. As noted by Krouwel (2012), it is no coincidence that these party families have 
been at the center of European governments and party politics for many years. As both families 
originated as political forces before many their present competitors, we argue that the age of parties 
might have a decisive impact on their human capital. The underlying idea is that party age serves as a 
proxy for institutionalization, with older parties having a larger, more developed organizational 
infrastructure. Time has enabled them to capture and accumulate more resources than their 
competitors. Furthermore, their continuing experience with government creates a persistent demand 
for expertise in political marketing and policy-making. Therefore, we expect the age of parties to have 
a positive effect on their human capital. 
 
H3: Older parties have a more capital-intensive organization than younger parties.  
 
However, the capital intensity of socialist and Christian democratic parties could also be linked to their 
their ideological profile. Both traditions were born out of historical movements reflecting the mass 
membership party. This organizational ideal type puts great emphasis on a strong extra-parliamentary 
party organization. Hence, this ‘contagion from the left’ (Duverger, 1964) fostered well-developed 
central party offices supported by both volunteers and bureaucrats. Up until today, this grassroots 
philosophy is echoed by newer movements on the left that put a stress on basisdemokratie or 
participative democracy. Furthermore, Smulders (2016) observed that leftist parties generally spend a 
significantly higher share of their resources on staff. We follow this train of thought for our fourth 
hypothesis. 
 
H4: Left-oriented parties have a more capital-intensive organization than parties on the 
right.  
 
We argue that the differences between the human capital parties are intrinsically connected to the 
relative size or strength of parties. Resources are of vital importance for sustaining a capital-intensive 
central office with a large number of staff. Since parties are generally subsidized on the basis of their 
electoral strength (Ohman, 2012), party strength should have a decisive impact on the availability of 
resources for party organizations that depend heavily on state funding, such as the Belgian cases (Van 
Biezen & Kopecký, 2014). Moreover, stronger parties can probably rely on a larger sum of membership 
fees and donations. As political parties might employ staff in proportion to the resources available to 
them, this determinant could certainly have an effect on the human capital of parties. As a result, our 
fifth and final hypothesis addresses the effect of party strength. 
 
H5: Parties with strong electoral support are more capital-intensive than parties with less 
electoral support.  
 
 
3. Political professionalism at Belgian party headquarters 
 
Due to its generous public funding and partitocratic features, Belgium is  a particularly interesting case 
for investigating staff at central party offices. As these headquarters concentrate a tremendous 
amount of resources and power, we consider Belgium a ‘most likely’ case for professionalized central 
offices.  
 
From a comparative perspective, Belgian parties have an exceptionally high financial dependence state 
funding. Reportedly, more than 80% of the financial backbone of party organizations consists of public 
resources, be it directly or indirectly (Maddens, Smulders, Wolfs, & Weekers, 2017; Van Biezen & 
Kopecký, 2014). Parties receive these public funds from a variety of sources.1 A first form of indirect 
subsidies was introduced in the beginning of the 1970s, providing allowances to the party groups in 
parliament. In 1989, the Belgian law on party finance introduced direct subsidies to political parties, 
marking a definitive shift towards cartelization (Katz & Mair, 1995). Consequently, these direct 
subsidies were substantially increased in 1993 to compensate for the ban on corporate donations. 
Furthermore, this process was facilitated by the growing regionalization of institutions within the 
Belgian political structure.  Both the national and regional levels of government are now tapped for 
direct and indirect public resources. Not surprisingly, this elaborated political finance structure has 
created exceptionally high levels of financial dependence. As a result, Belgium exemplifies cartelized 
state-party linkages in European democracies (Table 2).  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 For a more elaborate discussion on the evolution of the Belgian party finance system, see Weekers and 
Maddens (2009).  
  
Dependence Nations 
> 80% Belgium (85%), Italy (82%), Spain (80 – 95%)  
> 70% 
Slovakia (80%), Poland (80%), Luxembourg (75%), Denmark (75%), Norway 
(75%), Portugal (70 – 90%), Sweden (70 – 80%), Serbia (70 – 80%),  
Finland (70 – 80%), Croatia (70 – 80%)  
> 60% 
Slovenia (70%), Ireland (70%), Czech Republic (65 – 90%), Iceland (60 – 90%), 
Greece (60 – 90%)  
> 50% Hungary (60%), France (60%), Lithuania (52%) 
< 50% Netherlands (35 – 50%), Germany (30 – 40%) 
Table 2: Financial dependence in Europe (2007-2011); (Van Biezen & Kopecký, 2014) 
 
Belgian political professionalism is also shaped by the dominance of parties in the decision-making 
process. The country is considered a textbook example of partitocracy: extra-parliamentary party 
organizations are key institutions harboring the dominant party leaders and their supporting staff (De 
Winter & Dumont, 2006; Deschouwer, 2012). The distribution of direct and indirect sources of public 
funding reflects this situation. Not only do the parties receive direct financial support from the state, 
(parts of) the allowances of parliamentary party groups are transferred to parties’ central offices (De 
Winter & Dumont, 2000; Van Bunder, 1993). The allocation of staff shows similar patterns. Although 
policy experts are often paid through parliamentary resources, they are integrated into study centers 
at party headquarters (Pattyn, Van Hecke, Brans, & Libeer, 2014; Pattyn, Van Hecke, Pirlot, Rihoux, & 
Brans, 2017). Moreover, these policy experts play a significant role in maintaining the dominance of 
the central party leadership over the parliamentary face of the party (De Winter & Dumont, 2006).  
 
Analyzing the staff size of central party offices is relevant for several reasons. First, staff growth has 
not exclusively affected the ascendant party in public office (Katz & Mair, 1993, 2003). Long term 
analysis of staffing patterns in European democracies has indicated the transformation of central 
offices into professional campaign vehicles (Krouwel, 2012). Moreover, central offices still fulfill more 
classic functions of considerable importance such as the coordination between the branches of the 
party, candidate recruitment and membership administration. In addition to that, parties have direct 
control over their extra-parliamentary organization. Hence, staff size of central offices is the outcome 
of organizational choices and preferences. This area for agency is virtually non-existent in 
parliamentary offices: the amount of supporting staff is a direct product of their representational 
weight. As we aim to explain differences between parties, this paper aims to identify the factors that 
can explain these organizational preferences.  
 
4. Data and method 
 
While studies on party staff generally suffer from a lack of data, our analysis is built upon reliable data 
on staff levels and staff expenses originating from the official financial statements of the Belgian 
political parties. Since 1989, all parties represented in the Belgian federal Parliament are required to 
submit a yearly report on their finances, including revenues, expenses and assets. As a result, detailed 
data on the financial situation of Belgian political parties is available for a period of more than 25 years. 
However, only since 1999 these financial reports are comparable between parties and over time. In 
1999, the legislator determined a fixed list of party units for which finances had to be included in the 
financial statements (e.g. study centers, regional or provincial branches), while previously parties could 
freely decide on which units to include (Maddens et al., 2017). Moreover, party staff figures are only 
part of the statements from 1999 onwards.2 Since 2015, however, revised legislation applies, as a result 
of which staff figures are currently no longer mentioned in the financial statements. As a result, data 
on staff levels and staff expenses is comparable for a sixteen-year period (1999-2014). In this study, 
we examine the ten parties which had to file an annual report during this complete time period.3 As a 
result, the hypotheses formulated above will be tested through a combination of descriptive and 
explanatory quantitative analysis of a dataset containing 160 individual observations.  
 
To investigate whether the theoretical expectations correspond to these cases, four indicators were 
derived from the available data. As these key indicators are derived from a source with a consistent 
format, we argue that they offer the best achievable data on the presence of human capital at 
Belgium’s main parties. First, there is staff size containing all employees who are directly on the party 
payroll. These staff members often include personnel working at the party headquarters, study center 
and regional branches. Please note that staff members funded through indirect public resources (e.g. 
parliamentary or cabinet funding) are not included, neither are external consultants. Our second 
indicator is staff expenses, which represents the total amount of financial resources dedicated to staff 
                                                          
2 These staff figures only include the staff members on the payroll of the party, i.e. party staff employed and paid 
for by the party itself. These figures do not include staff members provided and paid for by the different 
Parliaments (e.g. MPs’ personal staff and party group staff) and external consultants. 
3 These parties are Agalev/Groen!/Groen, CVP/CD&V, Ecolo, PRL/MR, PS, PSC/cdH, SP/Sp.a(-spirit), Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang, VLD/Open Vld and VU/N-VA. 
on the party payroll. This indicator mirrors staff size: the same employees are included in this variable, 
while others are not counted. While staff size illustrates how much full time equivalents (from now on 
FTE) are employed through party means, staff expenses demonstrate how much a party spent on 
human capital in a given year. 
 
Table 3: Description and operationalization of quantitative indicators for human capital of parties 
 Description Operationalization 
Staff size Degree of human 
capital intensity, 
measured by the 
absolute number of 
employees. 
 
Number of full-time 
equivalents (FTE’s) on 
party payroll. 
 
Staff expenses Degree of human 
capital intensity, 
measured by the 
absolute amount of 
financial resources 
dedicated to staff. 
 
Financial resources 
spent on staff by party 
(expressed in €).  
 
Staff/Members The organizational 
balance between 
paid collaborators 
and volunteers.  
Staff size divided by 
number of party 
members, multiplied by 
thousand. 
 
Share of staff 
expenses 
The percentage of 
financial resources 
spent on human 
capital.  
 
Staff expenses divided 
by total expenses.  
 
 
 Although most of our analysis will focus on our core indicators, two extra variables were calculated to 
support our analysis. To complement staff size, staff was weighted in relation to membership using a 
staff-member ratio. In concreto, we calculated the number of employees for every thousand party 
members. Membership data for this indicator were derived from the MAPP project (van Haute, 2014). 
The interpretation of this indicator is connected to the evolution from labor-intensive to capital-
intensive party organization. The higher the value of a party on this indicator, the further it is supposed 
to be removed from the ideal type of the mass membership party. From this point of view, the staff-
member ratio, measures the distance between a party organization and its supposed social roots. As 
a result, this balance offers clues about the equilibrium (or lack thereof) between the day-to-day 
functioning of a party and its supporting members. While the staff-member ratio clarifies an additional 
aspect of the organizational side of human capital, we also rely on an extra indicator to interpret the 
financial side to party staff. The share of staff expenses identifies the percentage of financial resources 
that are spent on staff by a given party. These values shed a light on the importance of the staff body 
for parties, regardless of the size of resources – allowing us to compare large and small parties.  
 
5. Descriptive analysis 
 
In this section, we first explore the aggregate staff levels and staff expenses of the ten parties included 
in our dataset. As it can be expected, however, that substantial differences exist between the parties, 
we subsequently also make a more in-depth assessment of the parties separately.  
 
5.1. General trends: rising professionalism? 
 
How has political professionalism evolved in Belgium between 1999 and 2014? As political scientists 
often consider professionalism to be ever increasing, we start our empirical analysis by testing this 
basic assumption. Potential trends were analyzed along four indicators related to political 
professionalism. All values should be interpreted as aggregates representing the sum of all ten parties 
included in our analysis. As illustrated by the staff numbers (Table 4), the total amount of Belgian party 
staff remained relatively stable. The sum of political collaborators directly employed by Belgian parties 
fluctuated between 325 and 379, showing no clear overall trend of increase or decrease. These staff 
size data do not support our first hypothesis, as we anticipated that Belgian parties would have grown 
more capital-intensive between 1999 and 2014.  
 
However, staff expenses (our second key indicator) did undergo considerable evolution. Intuitively, 
one would expect the evolution of staff expenses to follow the same pattern as staff figures. Although 
this parallel holds for the period between 2000 and 2008, staff costs start to break away from staff 
figures in 2009 and keep increasing. This decoupling between staff and staff expenses is illustrated in 
Figure 1. As the share of staff expenses suggests, parties were not necessarily compelled to dig deeper 
into their pockets. They constantly spent 25 to 30 % of their expenses to personnel. An analysis of the 
party-specific evolutions in staff expenses (not shown here) illustrated that the lion share of this trend 
was caused by evoltions within a single party (PS). Therefore, we argue that the increase in staff 
expenses should not be considered a general trend.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Staff numbers, number of members, staff expenses (indexed)  
and share of staff expenses; aggregate numbers for all ten parties, 1999-2014. 
 Staff Members Staff Expenses 
Share of Staff 
Expenses (%) 
1999 341 462.404 24.833.644 28 
2000 325 455.392 19.637.274 29 
2001 368 427.214 19.223.781 24 
2002 368 405.026 20.302.476 25 
2003 397 396.560 19.900.646 20 
2004 358 390.422 19.773.401 22 
2005 342 401.884 19.240.901 25 
2006 357 411.141 19.298.687 21 
2007 341 381.377 20.543.344 22 
2008 332 374.359 19.506.120 23 
2009 348 364.524 21.440.035 23 
2010 351 368.480 21.732.297 23 
2011 344 373.234 21.947.863 27 
2012 365 382.752 24.320.665 27 
2013 379 378.317 25.496.246 31 
2014 379 380.817 26.116.082 28 
 
 
Figure 1: Staff numbers (left axis) and staff expenses (indexed, right axis),  
aggregate numbers for all ten parties, 1999-2014.  
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 5.2. Exploring interparty differences 
 
A party-specific analysis offers a more in in-depth assessment of the human capital of Belgian parties. 
It enables to register differences of capital intensity between parties and illustrates how specific parties 
evolved between 1999 and 2014. We first examine the balance between the 10 parties, followed up 
by description of how they evolved throughout the studied period.   
Interparty differences demonstrate a wide range of variation. As we observe the party averages for 
the period 1999-2014 for our key variables in Table 5, differences are generally quite large. Comparing 
the average staff size of Vlaams Belang (4,67 FTE) with PS (76,71 FTE), it is evident that the inner 
workings of these party organizations must bear little resemblance. The trimodal distribution of this 
variable suggests three more or less separated categories of parties. The first category, consisting of 
cdH and the socialist party family, employs the largest amount staff. The middle category harbors 
CD&V and the liberal party family, while the green party family, N-VA and Vlaams Belang have the 
smallest bodies of staff. Not surprisingly, these patterns largely correspond to differences between 
parties concerning staff expenses. Again, the category of ‘big spenders’ consists of socialists and 
Christian democrats, headed by PS. In the middle category, the liberal parties are joined by cdH and 
Ecolo. Groen, N-VA and Vlaams Belang spend the smallest amount of resources on staff.  
 
Turning our attention towards evolutions between 1999 and 2014, we observe that most of these 
interparty differences are consistent through time (Figure 2). However, some parties did take on new 
positions. CdH changed gear in 2001, joining the socialist party family in the upper category. N-VA 
followed a similar strategy following its landslide victory in 2010. The party headed towards joining the 
liberal party family and CD&V in the middle category. Ecolo is characterized by a slow but steady 
growth of staff infrastructure. PS is a peculiar case: although the party retained a stable staff level, it 
invested quite heavily in staff remuneration after 2010 (supra). Sp.a carried out a gradual downsizing 
operation after 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Staff numbers, number of members, number of FTEs per 1000 members, staff expenses (indexed), 
share of staff expenses and cost per FTE (indexed), averages for all ten parties, 1999-2014. 
 
Staff Members 
Staff 
Expenses 
Share of Staff 
Expenses (%) 
PS 77 87.773 4.952.229 36 
PSC/cdH 62 21.314 2.115.268 32 
SP/Sp.a 61 58.571 3.005.902 30 
CVP/CD&V4 44 80.008 3.047.131 28 
PRL/MR 37 30.732 2.203.032 22 
VLD/Open Vld 32 70.313 2.151.246 26 
Ecolo 18 4.637 2.061.626 33 
Agalev/Groen!/Groen 10 5.888 819.779 19 
VU/N-VA 10 18.671 776.727 19 
Vlaams Blok/Belang 5 19.213 312.650 4 
 
 
Figure 2: Staff figures, Flemish parties and Francophone parties separately, 1999-2014. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 For the financial indicators, no party-specific data for CD&V and N-VA exist for 2007 and 2008. These parties 
submitted a combined annual account during this two-year period, since they formed an electoral cartel. 
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6. Explanatory analysis 
 
To perform an explanatory analysis on the apparent differences between parties, a multivariate 
regression model was constructed with staff size as the dependent variable (expressed in number of 
FTE’s). To test the four hypotheses directed at inter-party differences, the theoretical arguments we 
developed earlier were translated into independent variables: party system, party age, ideology and 
party strength. Party system was operationalized with a dummy variable, with the Flemish party 
system corresponding to the value of 1. The age of parties was applied as the amount of years since 
the founding of their extra-parliamentary organizations. For the traditional party families (socialist, 
Christian democrat and liberal), 1946 was used as a the point for the development of current party 
organizations. Ideological orientation was applied via the left-right scale of the Chapel Hill dataset 
(Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). Party strength was measured as a parties’ share of the vote 
during the most recent election, either at the federal or regional level. As a complement, an additional 
variable was created to capture the dynamic impact electoral victory or loss. Hence, electoral 
performance measure the percentage of votes won or lost during the most recent election, either at 
the federal or regional level. In addition to these variables, the model controls for government status 
(in government = 1) and the specifics of election times (election year = 1).  As the number of 
observations is limited (N=160), the simplicity of the model was consciously guarded. The number of 
independent variables was restricted to 7, resulting about 22 observations for each independent 
variable.  
 
The model demonstrates significant effects for party age, party strength, ideology and electoral 
performance (Table 6) . The relationship between party age and staff size is positive: one year of party 
development translates into 0,86 FTE. The impact of party strength is similar: one percentage of the 
vote corresponds to 1,1 FTE. In contrast, electoral performance shows a negative effect: electoral 
progress of one percentage lowers staff size with 1,11 FTE. The same goes for ideology, staff size 
decreases with 4,22 FTE’s for each unit on the left-right scale. Al four effects are significant on the 
0,001 level. With an adjusted r square of 0,78, the model account for 78% percent of the variance in 
staff size for our observations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Explaining staff size (Multivariate regression analysis, N=160) 
Variable Unstand. Coeff. S.E. Stand. Coeff. 
Party system  
Party age 
Ideology  
Party strength 
Electoral performance 
Government status 
Election year 
 
-3.6 
0.86*** 
-4.22*** 
1.10*** 
-1.11*** 
-2.84 
-0.22 
2.26 
0.08 
0.45 
0.15 
0.21 
2.59 
1.88 
-0.07 
0.56 
-0.4 
0.37 
-0.21 
-0.05 
-0.004 
Constant -0.33 3.93  
Adjusted R² 0.78   
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
With the exception of the anticipated effect of party system, all hypotheses are supported by the 
explanatory model. Although Flemish parties do have less staff members, the difference with 
Francophone parties is not significant. As a result, hypothesis 1 is rejected. The anticipated effects of 
party age, ideology and party strength meet the expectations: older, more left-oriented and electorally 
stronger parties employ a significantly larger amount of staff members.  
 
The analysis suggests that party age, ideological orientation and electoral strength have a considerable 
impact on the staff infrastructure of Belgian extra-parliamentary party organizations. In this section, 
we discuss the implications of these effects and reflect on what our observations can (and cannot) 
teach us about political professionalism at large. As stated earlier, the analysis aimed at specific aspects 
of professionalism: quantitative indicators for internal employees paid by the party payroll. Hence, the 
analysis does not include external consultants or employees paid by public institutions, nor does it 
cover address the kind of employees (bureaucrats vs. professionals) that were counted. These were 
conscious choices for delineating the empirical focus and operationalizing variables and results should 
be interpreted accordingly.   
 
Our analysis demonstrates the long-lasting inheritance of the mass party model: older, left-oriented 
parties are more capital-intensive. Yet the process of professionalization is often assumed to be 
disadvantageous to this organizational model. The distribution of staff and resources within parties is 
a key component of the well-known cartelization thesis. It has been utilized as an indicator for both 
the negligence of the party on the ground and the ascendancy of the party in public office (Katz, 2002; 
Katz & Mair, 1993, 2003). However, the extra-parliamentary organization is of course the most obvious 
target for professionalization for parties adhering to the mass membership model. Older parties still 
have the highest membership figures compared to others (Table 5). Furthermore, maintaining a party 
on the ground with elaborate membership structures and subunits simply requires organizational staff. 
These observations corroborate with existing empirical research: left-oriented parties reportedly 
spend more on organization and less on campaigning compared to parties on the right (Smulders, 
2016). This might imply that more market-oriented parties on the right represent a different type of 
professionalism, relying more on external consultants. Such differences cannot covered through an 
analysis of the internal professionalism of central offices. In the same vein, our observations offer no 
clues on the qualitative aspects of staff members (e.g. skill level) in older, left-oriented parties.  
 
In addition to party age and ideology, the strength of a party has a decisive impact on the capital-
intensity of central offices. Not unexpectedly, the parties capturing the most votes (and public funding) 
construct the most elaborate staff infrastructures. For starters, the need for expertise and support by 
paid staff is higher, since the strongest parties are constantly at the center of the political arena. Yet 
more importantly, parties with a larger vote share have a greater amount of public resources (both 
direct and indirect) at their disposal than their smaller counterparts. This effect is clearly illustrated by 
the significant impact of both party strength and electoral performance in the explanatory model. The 
influence of party strength is clear-cut, while the negative impact of electoral performance illuminates 
how Belgian party organizations freely allocate the available public resources for staffing purposes. In 
short, the party payroll (extra-parliamentary organization) and parliamentary party group resources 
behave as communicating vessels. When parties make electoral progress, the additional resources of 
the party in public office are wielded to downsize staff costs on the party payroll. Vice versa, party 
payrolls become more leveraged in staff costs after electoral defeat. In doing so, Belgian party 
organizations appear to aim for the minimization of staff costs within their own organizations.   
 
To sum up, this analysis demonstrates how older, left-oriented and electorally strong parties have the 
most capital-intensive central party offices in Belgium. Since the analysis only investigated specific 
aspects of professionalism (quantitative, internal, central office), this does not necessarily mean that 
other parties can be considered less professional. More likely, other parties embody a different type 
of political professionalism. The results only illustrate that newer, right-oriented and electorally 
weaker parties rely on less internal staff members at the central office. These other types of political 
professionalism might rely on more external consultants or have a smaller internal staff with higher 
levels of expertise. Moreover, the organizational center of gravity of these parties might rather be 
concentrated in the public face of the party (parliament, government). As for now, we can only 
speculate how these aspects of professionalism are affected by party age, ideological orientation and 
electoral size. Little is known about the factors that shape decisions for hiring external consultants and 
our knowledge about the qualitative aspects of professionalism (e.g. skill levels) remains very limited. 
Future research could clarify to what extent these other dimensions of professionalism complement 
the capital-intensity of extra-parliamentary organizations.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the staff levels and staff expenses of political parties in Belgium from 1999 
to 2014. The central focus was on the permanent staff of parties, i.e. personnel on the party payrolls, 
excluding party group staff (paid for by the parliaments) and external consultants. Our data were 
gathered from the parties’ annual financial statements. The major advantage of this approach is that 
these are official data that are comparable over time and between parties, given several legal 
obligations, while data for previous empirical studies were generally gathered by means of surveys and 
party contacts (Katz & Mair, 1992; Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016). This latter method inevitably 
bears a risk with regard to reliability and comparability of data, as it often allows parties to decide 
autonomously which staff members to include in their staff figures (such as party group staff). 
Therefore, the present study can offers a first systematic and reliable analysis of political party staff in 
Belgium.  
 
The results illustrate that quantitative professionalism did not increase between 1999 and 2014 and 
identify party age, ideology, electoral strength and electoral performance as the key determinants for 
the human capital of Belgian central party offices. The temporal evolution of our indicators does not a 
substantial process of professionalization within extra-parliamentary party organization after 1999. 
Although earlier empirical studies reported increasing capital-intensity from a long-term perspective 
(Farrell & Webb, 2002; Krouwel, 2012), Belgian parties appear to have reached a point of saturation, 
at least in the short term.  
 
More importantly, this paper adds a new dimension to the empirical study of professionalization by 
assessing the party characteristics that explain variation in capital intensity within countries.  In the 
Belgian case, especially older, left-oriented and electorally strong parties have elaborate staff 
infrastructures at their central offices. As the analysis focused on specific aspects of political 
professionalization (staff and financial resources spent within the extra-parliamentary organization), it 
seems likely that other parties might invest more in alternatives forms of professionalism. For instance, 
these parties might rely more on external consultants, public party offices or have a smaller staff with 
higher skill levels. The explanatory model also illustrated how well-resourced party organizations 
behave in an environment with little structural inhibitions on their organizational preferences. For 
instance, the impact of electoral performance on human capital unveils that parties aim to externalize 
the cost of their human capital by downsizing the central office when public offices can absorb 
additional staff. This effect cuts both ways: extra-parliamentary parties will on their turn incorporate 
more staff when public resources wane.    
 
Our findings raise new questions for empirical research on professionalization. First, future research 
could investigate whether the same explanatory factors (party age, ideology and party strength) are at 
play in other nations. Second, the existing line of investigation with a focus on the quantitative aspects 
professionalism (amount of staff) should be complemented by research on qualitative aspects such as 
the characteristics of staff members (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017; Webb & Fisher, 2003). It seems unlikely 
that the quantitative measurements used in this paper and others (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Katz & Mair, 
1993; Krouwel, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016) are an appropriate indicator or proxy for more qualitative 
aspects. One might well expect the opposite to be the case, with parties developing different types of 
organizational professionalism.  
 
However, the relationship between these conceptual dimensions continues to be a blind spot. Until 
such a complementary analysis receives empirical attention, our understanding of political 
professionalism will remain one-sided.  With this analysis of the human capital of political parties in 
Belgium, we nevertheless hope to have taken a first important step in the direction of more profound 
and in-depth research into the importance of political party staff. 
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